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Peer review supports scientific conferences in selecting
high-quality papers for publication. Referees are
expected to evaluate submissions equitably according
to objective criteria (e.g., originality of the contribution,
soundness of the theory, validity of the experiments). We
argue that the submission date of papers is a subjective
factor playing a role in the way they are evaluated.
Indeed, program committee (PC) chairs and referees
process submission lists that are usually sorted by
paperIDs. This order conveys chronological information,
as papers are numbered sequentially upon reception.
We show that order effects lead to unconscious favoring
of early-submitted papers to the detriment of later-
submitted papers. Our point is supported by a study of
42 peer-reviewed conferences in Computer Science
showing a decrease in the number of bids placed on
submissions with higher paperIDs. It is advised to coun-
terbalance order effects during the bidding phase of peer
review by promoting the submissions with fewer bids to
potential referees. This manipulation intends to better
share bids out among submissions in order to attract
qualified referees for all submissions. This would secure
reviews from confident referees, who are keen on
voicing sharp opinions and recommendations (accep-
tance or rejection) about submissions. This work
contributes to the integrity of peer review, which is man-
datory to maintain public trust in science.
Introduction
Scientific conferences are premier venues for disseminat-
ing the results of late-breaking research. Published papers
are selected through the peer review process, also known as
the referee system (Zuckerman & Merton, 1971). Nowa-
days, peer-reviewed conferences increasingly rely on paper
bids. These are composed of the five stages depicted in
Figure 1.
• S1. Authors prepare a paper according to the call for papers
issued by a given conference. This document states the topics
of the conference, as well as the opening and closing dates for
paper submission. Authors are allowed to submit papers any
time between these two dates.
• S2. Scientists acknowledged for their expertise in the confer-
ence domain (i.e., peers) are invited to review the submitted
papers. They are allowed to bid for the papers they would like
to evaluate.
• S3. The program committee (PC) chairs assign submissions to
peers according to their bids, whenever possible.
• S4. Peers act as referees to evaluate the submissions they were
assigned to. They grade papers according to several pre-
defined criteria, such as originality and significance of the
contributions.
• S5. PC chairs select the papers with best quality according
to the evaluations, comments, and recommendations of the
referees. These papers are then published in the conference
proceedings.
The scientific community and the general public have
expectations for peer review. On the one hand, it is expected
to act as a fair filter to select papers according to only
objective criteria assessing their scientific qualities. On the
other hand, peer review is expected to enforce equality
among papers regarding their acceptance or rejection.
Unfortunately, various inadequacies affect peer review, such
as status bias, gender bias, objectivity bias, and conflict of
interests (Zuckerman & Merton, 1971; Benos et al., 2007).
Regarding scientific conferences, we argue that the sub-
mission date of papers is one extra factor at play during the
peer review process. We hypothesize that order effects
(Becker, 1954) are introduced when papers are chronologi-
cally presented to referees (during S2 and S4) and PC chairs
(during S3 and S5). Paper evaluation would then result from
objective judgment and from a subjective feature of submit-
ted papers: their submission date. Although undocumented
to date for peer-reviewed conferences, we believe that this
phenomenon is detrimental to the integrity of peer review.
The article is organized as follows. We first discuss how
submission dates may affect peer review supported by paper
bids through order effects. Then we design a method to
check the existence of such order effects on a sample of 42
peer-reviewed conferences from the Computer Science field.
The results bolstering this hypothesis are then presented.
Finally, we propose to capitalize on order effects to secure
reviews from expert referees. This contribution is intended
to contribute to ensuring the integrity of peer review.
How Do Submission Dates Challenge
Peer Review?
Peer-reviewed conferences have entered the digital age.
Most of them are supported by online conference manage-
ment systems nowadays. These systems assign a sequential
number called “paperID” to each submitted paper. Then, for
any given conference, the list of submissions to review is
sorted by paperID. This order conveys chronological clues:
the list starts with early-submitted papers and goes on to
last-minute submissions at the end. In this section, we argue
that order effects may lead scientists to favor (or unfavor)
some papers because of their submission date. Such an
unfair treatment questions the integrity of peer review.
Peer Review and Conference Management Systems
Conferences have become major scientific events attract-
ing worldwide audiences. In Computer Science, for
instance, “highly selective” conferences receive several
hundred submissions, less than 30% of which getting
accepted for publication (Chen & Konstan, 2010). This is
the case of the three leading conferences shown in Figure 2,
for instance. Publishing in such conferences is also appeal-
ing because papers in their proceedings reach a large read-
ership. Freyne, Coyle, Smyth, and Cunningham (2010)
reported that these papers receive more citations than jour-
nals listed in the bottom half of the ISI Web of Knowledge
impact ranking for journals.
Peer review now has become the standard procedure to
select papers for publication (Benos et al., 2007).While peer
review supports both journals (Cronin, 2011) and confer-
ences (Hartvigsen, Wei, & Czuchlewski, 1999), the present
study focuses on conferences supported by bids. Papers
FIG. 1. The five usual stages of the peer review process for conference paper selection supported by paper bids.
FIG. 2. Number of papers submitted to three leading Computer Science conferences held between 2007 and 2011. Accepted papers are shown in green,
while rejected papers are shown in blue. (Source: the ACM Digital Library http://dl.acm.org). [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is
available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
submitted to conferences are assigned to at least two expert
referees drawn from the conference PC—when not rejected
outright by PC chairs for not complying with the topics of the
conference call for papers. Referees assess each paper
according to several criteria (e.g., novelty, contribution)
before issuing a recommendation (e.g., weak or strong
accept, neutral, weak or strong reject). In the end, the scien-
tific community expects these recommendations to inform
PCchairswhen selecting paperswith best quality and impact.
Running a peer-reviewed conference with several
hundred submissions implies the synchronization of the
tasks of thousands of people who act as authors, referees, or
both. Fortunately, several conference management systems,
such as EasyChair, ConfManager, ConfMaster, ConfTool,
and Precision Conference (see http://easychair.org, http://
confmanager.com, http://confmaster.net, http://conftool.net,
and http://precisionconference.com) have been developed to
cope with this daunting task. These websites support the
researchers involved in the five stages of the peer review
process (Figure 1). For instance, most conference manage-
ment systems allow referees to bid on submissions prior to
paper assignment (Rodriguez, Bollen, & Van de Sompel,
2007). Then PC chairs rely on referees’ areas of expertise
and preferences (deduced from the bids) to assign papers
manually or with the help of various algorithms (Wang,
Chen, & Miao, 2008). Nowadays, virtually all conferences
rely on a conference management system.
What Is Behind PaperIDs?
Conference management systems assign an identifier to
each paper submitted to a given conference. This identifier,
called paperID, is usually a number starting with 1 if this is
the first submission received. Then it is incremented for
subsequent submissions. In other words, the n papers sub-
mitted to a conference are numbered with paperIDs from
1 to n.
The chronology of submissions is revealed by paperIDs,
since they give a clue about the submission date of each
paper. Early-submitted papers get low paperIDs (i.e., close
to 1), whereas last-minute papers receive high paperIDs (i.e.,
close to n).
Order Effects on Choice
Various studies have shown that people are influenced by
the order of presentation when having to select items from a
list according to their preferences.
When desirable items are randomly distributed through-
out a list, people still tend to select early positions. Becker
(1954) studied the chance of selection of five radio
program types (e.g., news, popular music, sports) among
16 radio program types presented to 16,193 people. Two
parameters were controlled in this experiment: the order of
presentation and the popularity of the program types.
These were counterbalanced respectively by a Latin square
and by an analysis of variance. The results showed that the
position of items influenced their chance of selection, with
early positions attracting significantly more votes than later
positions. Becker (1954, p. 276) even noticed that “the
later on a check-list that a program type is listed, the less
the chance that someone will select it as one of his five
favorites.” Such order effects were also found to influence
the selection of the names of candidates to elections held
in the three largest counties of Ohio in the USA (Miller &
Krosnick, 1998).
When desirable items are expected to be ranked at the top
of the list, people tend to select early positions even if this
condition is not satisfied. For instance, Craswell, Zoeter,
Taylor, and Ramsey (2008) conducted an experiment with
manipulated results of web search engines. The authors
found that users kept clicking on documents from top to
bottom of the result list, even if most relevant documents
were not at the top of the list.
The “direction of comparison” also has an influence on
item evaluation regarding one’s preferences. For instance,
when being presented with the sequence of items A and B,
subjects are more likely to comment on the positive (i.e.,
desirable) features of B that were not present in A, unlike
when presented with the sequence of items B and A (Bruine
de Bruin & Keren, 2003). This has direct implications for
the fairness of competitions using jury evaluations (Bruine
de Bruin, 2005, 2006).
The familiarity of the person with the judged items seems
to play a role in item selection too. About wine tasting,
Mantonakis, Rodero, Lesschaeve, and Hastie (2009) found a
primacy effect for the general public (i.e., selection of earlier
items), whereas expert tasters showed a recency effect (i.e.,
selection of later items). Various experiments with paintings,
American Idol audition clips, jellybeans, and female faces
were conducted by Li and Epley (2009). The authors found
serial position effects, since people tended to select early
items when being presented with globally undesirable items.
Conversely, they tended to select later items when presented
with globally desirable items.
Finally, people tend to underestimate the time spent
choosing from a long list of items (Fasolo, Carmeci, &
Misuraca, 2009). Attention decrement and boredom are also
human factors contributing to order effects on choice
(Mantonakis et al., 2009).
Potential Implications for the Integrity of Peer Review
Throughout the peer review process, conference papers
are processed by PC chairs and referees. They work with a
submission list produced by the conference management
system. The n papers of this list are presented chronologi-
cally, as the list is sorted by paperID. This order may influ-
ence the scientists involved during the various stages of peer
review depicted in Figure 1 as follows.
• During S2, referees skim through the submission list, bidding
on a handful of papers according to titles and abstracts (full
text is usually not provided in S2). Here, referees may feel it
tiresome to get a sense of each paper, as it requires reading
titles and abstracts. We may recall the findings of Fasolo et al.
(2009) and Mantonakis et al. (2009) about the difficulty of
item selection and resulting boredom to support this point. As
a result, referees may focus their efforts on papers presented
at the top of the list (primacy effect). In addition, since each
referee is expected to review k << n papers, the paper pool
seems globally undesirable to them.According to the findings
of Li and Epley (2009), this may motivate referees to select
early-submitted papers (those with low paperIDs). Such a
phenomenon is all the likelier with leading conferences total-
ing hundreds of papers.
• During S3, PC chairs go through the submission list to assign
k << n papers to each referee. According to our experience, it
seems that k = 5 6 2 for most conferences. Again, order
effects may arise if PC chairs process the submission list
sequentially. Hence, early-submitted papers may be assigned
to qualified referees willing to review them, for they have bid
on them. Meanwhile, late-submitted papers may be assigned
to referees who have not bid on them or who do not have their
share of papers to review yet (i.e., assignment by default
instead of preference-wise).
• During S4, referees are given the k << n papers for evaluation
purposes, with no guarantee that their preferences (i.e., bids)
were satisfied. Assigned papers are usually sorted by paperID
in the list presented to referees. Here the order in which
papers are then evaluated may affect their evaluation (Bruine
de Bruin, 2005, 2006).
• During S5, PC chairs repeatedly go through the list of evalu-
ated papers to review the referees’ evaluations, to engage
discussions on papers with diverging evaluations, and even-
tually to decide their rejection or acceptation.
To sum up, order effects may lead referees and PC chairs
alike to favor papers submitted early (i.e., listed in low
positions) at the expense of papers submitted later (i.e.,
listed in high positions). Such a different treatment would be
detrimental to the peer review process, which is expected to
ensure the integrity of science and public trust (Wing & Chi,
2011).
In this article we focus on the issue related to the bids
collected during S3. It is our hypothesis that order effects
play a role in the way referees place bids on submissions. In
the next sections we bolster this hypothesis through explor-
atory statistics applied to the logs of peer-reviewed past
conferences.
Method
The hypothesis under study applies to conferences imple-
menting (P1) a peer-review process supported by (P2) paper
bids. We intend to check it against data from past confer-
ences complying with P1 and P2. These data currently exist,
since they are generated by conference management
systems. The UML class diagram in Figure 3 models the
data considered in the current study. We discuss it according
to the stages of the peer-review process introduced in
Figure 1 (terms in italics refer to attributes in the UML
diagram).
• S1.Authors submit papers to conferences. Papers are assigned
a sequential paperID: the paper submitted first is assigned the
value 1, the paper submitted second is assigned the value 2,
and so on.
• S2. Referees are presented with the list of the n papers sub-
mitted during S1. They are given the opportunity to bid on
papers whose subject is interesting or related to their area of
expertise. Conversely, referees can state conflicts of interests,
limited expertise, or disinterest. These preferences are stored
in the interest attribute (positive, neutral, or negative) of the
Bidding class.
• S3. PC chairs assign k << n papers to referees according to
paper topics, referee areas of expertise, and referee prefer-
ences acquired during S2. Each paper is assigned to at least
two referees.
• S4. Referees mark papers globally (overall attribute) and
detail their evaluation according to several criteria (e.g., value
of the contribution, paper originality and quality, relevance to
the call of papers, significance of the results). In addition,
referees evaluate how confident they are in their review, as a
way to state their degree of expertise regarding the evaluated
paper. These marks kept in the Evaluation class are usually
given on a 7-point Likert (1932) scale (e.g., strong reject,
reject, weak reject, neutral, weak accept, accept, strong
accept).
• S5. PC chairs proceed through the papers to accept or reject
them. They may rely on the average score computed from
referees’ weighted marks—the relative importance of each
criterion is up to each conference. In the end, each paper has
a given status (e.g., accept as full paper, accept as short paper,
accept as poster, reject).
We intend to check whether the submission date of
papers (conveyed by paperIDs) is related to the number of
bids received. A scatter plot akin to Figure 4 is generated for
each conference. The independent variable (x axis) is the
position of the paper (i.e., paperID in Figure 3), while the
dependent variable (y axis) is the number of bids.
FIG. 3. UML class diagram modeling the data generated by
peer-reviewed conferences supported by a bidding process.
In addition, the linear regression y = m ¥ x + p is com-
puted with standard least squares fitting for estimatingm and
p. The coefficient of determination R2 ∈ [0,1] associated
with the linear regression measures the goodness of fit (i.e.,
it is inversely proportional to the squared difference between
data points and the trend line). The slope of the trend line
(i.e., m) informs us about the relationship between x and y,
while the magnitude of R2 informs us about the quality of the
approximation of the data points by the trend line (R2 → 1
shows a better approximation). Figure 4 shows a decreasing
number of bids as paper positions increase. In other words,
papers with low positions (i.e., early submissions) attract
more bids than papers with higher positions (i.e., later sub-
missions).
Having approximated the data points of each conference
by a single trend line with associated R2, a broader perspec-
tive is then taken by plotting the conference trend lines
altogether (e.g., see Figure 14). Each trend line starts at
position x = 1, and ends at the highest paper position of the
considered conference (i.e., x = n with a different n for each
conference). Consequently, conferences with a larger
number of papers are represented with longer trend lines.
Finally, the quality of the approximations by trend lines is
shown with varying line weights: the stronger the goodness
to fit R2, the bolder the trend line. This is to emphasize trend
lines that better approximate the initial data points. Four
groups of trend lines are computed according to their R2. The
group with the 25% highest R2 is labeled “First quarter of R2”
and plotted in weight 4, while the following 25% is labeled
“Second quarter of R2” and plotted in weight 3, and so on. The
overall tendency is then visible by observing all the slopes.
In addition, the distribution of slope values is studied via
box plots a.k.a. box-and-whisker diagrams (McGill, Tukey, &
Larsen, 1978) to assess the skewness of data. Slope values
skewed towards negative values show a decrease in the depen-
dent variable when the independent variable (i.e., paper posi-
tion) increases, thus supporting our hypothesis.
In the next section we introduce our findings based on the
logs of peer-reviewed past conferences with paper bids.
Data and Results
The working hypothesis was tested with data from
conference logs. Among the various available conference
management systems we retained ConfMaster, for it has
been used by 324 conference editions (Conference list:
http://confmaster.net/references.php) as of May 2012. Most
of them are conferences in Computer Science. The follow-
ing sections report statistics about 42 randomly selected
peer-reviewed conferences with 157,332 bids placed by
2,989 referees, who wrote 19,108 reviews about 7,351
papers.
Characteristics of the 42 Peer-Reviewed Conferences
The ConfMaster team agreed to provide us with anony-
mous data related to 42 peer-reviewed conferences drawn
from its pool of 324 conferences. These 42 conferences
were held between 2003 and 2011 with supporting paper
bids. These data match the UML class diagram shown in
Figure 3, except for some attributes that were not provided
(e.g., conference name, reviewer identity, review contents)
for anonymity concerns. We publish this data set called
ConfMaster2003–2011 as an Additional Supporting Infor-
mation (seeAppendixA). This ensures the reproducibility of
our results, while enabling other researchers to investigate
other aspects of the peer review process from this data set.
A total of 7,351 papers were submitted to the 42 confer-
ences under study. The box plot in Figure 5 depicts the
distribution of the number of papers per conference. As
shown by the green box, the middle half of all conferences
attracted between 70 and 204 papers (Mdn = 102). The black
dots show four outlying conferences that have attracted
more than 387 papers.
The distribution of acceptance rates for the 42 confer-
ences is shown in Figure 6. Regarding full papers, the
middle half of the conferences features a selectivity lying
between 14% and 31% (Mdn = 19%). There are three
FIG. 4. Scatter plot for conference number 3,903 (see Appendix A)
showing the number of bids received per paper position, as well as the trend
line for the data points (linear least squares regression with associated
coefficient of determination R2). [Color figure can be viewed in the online
issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
FIG. 5. Box plot of the number of papers submitted to the 42 conferences.
[Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at
wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
FIG. 6. Box plot of full paper acceptance rates for the 42 conferences.
[Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at
wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
outlying conferences with selectivity greater than 51%. Pro-
vided that highly selective Computer Science conferences
have a 30% or less acceptance rate according to Chen and
Konstan (2010), our data set is mainly composed of highly
selective conferences.
Characteristics of the 157,332 bids
ConfMaster allows referees to bid on submissions in
order to signal positive preference (denoted by + for
“interested” and by ++ for “very interested”), negative pref-
erence (denoted by - for “dislike”) or conflicts of interests
(denoted by ). Overall, 76% of all referees placed a bid on
at least one paper, with a median of 12 bids per referee per
conference, which corresponds to a median of 5% of all
submissions. Figure 7 shows that negative bids and conflicts
of interests (56%) were slightly more frequent than positive
bids (44%). It is worth noting that nearly half of all bids are
negative (-), which suggests that it is simpler for referees to
disqualify than to pick papers during S2.
Let us focus on the papers assigned by PC chairs during
S3. Figure 8 shows the distribution of the 19,108 reviews
with respect to their associated bids, if any (i.e., some papers
attracted no bids, others were assigned to referees although
they placed no bids on them). More than half of all reviews
were written by referees who placed a positive bid on the
evaluated paper. Only 1% of the reviews were done by
referees who placed a negative bid on the paper. Only two
reviews were done by referees who declared a conflict of
interest ( ). This suggests that the current use of negative
bids and conflicts of interests (see Figure 7) succeeds in
avoiding to assign unwanted papers to referees. Notice that
no bids were placed on papers evaluated in 42% of the
reviews under study.
It is generally assumed that referees place positive bids
on the submissions for which they feel qualified to review
(Rodriguez et al., 2007). We wondered whether reviews pre-
ceded by a positive bid were likelier to exhibit a strong
referee confidence. This point is supported in Figure 9,
where reviews following positive bids seem to be associated
with higher referee confidence values. As a consequence,
encouraging referees to place positive bids may be an effec-
tive way to raise reviews with strong confidence.
One way to improve the quality of reviews would be to
reduce the large proportion of “orphan” papers, namely,
the 42% bid-less reviews (Figure 8). Many factors can lead
to bid-less submissions. On the one hand, the topics of
some papers simply appeal to no bidders at all. On the
other hand, some papers are displayed at the bottom of
biddable papers, for they were submitted quite late. In the
latter case, the referee may have failed to bid on interesting
papers only because of their submission date. Hence, the
evaluation of these papers would partly depend on their
submission date.
FIG. 7. Distribution of the 157,332 bids placed by referees with respect to
the interest value (i.e., , -, +, or ++). [Color figure can be viewed in the
online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
FIG. 8. Distribution of the 19,108 reviews with respect to the nature of the
bid (if any) placed by the referees in charge of writing the reviews. [Color
figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at
wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
FIG. 9. Confidence of referees as stated in the reviews they made for
papers they bid on (with a given interest value) and were assigned to. The
mean (m) and the standard deviation (s) of confidence values are showed by
bullets (m) and bars (m 6 s). [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,
which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
Characteristics of the 19,108 Reviews
Each review conveys a referee’s evaluation of a paper to
which an overall mark is assigned (i.e., an integer value
between 1 and 10). Marks 3 and 4 are the most frequent
ones, accounting for 37% of all marks (Figure 10). Such a
high proportion of low overall marks suggests that most
submissions show poor quality and do not deserve publica-
tion. This quality issue may be one factor explaining the low
acceptance rates reported by Chen and Konstan (2010) for
Computer Science.
In addition to their comments and overall mark, referees
also estimate their confidence in the review through an
integer value ranging from 1 to 10. The distribution of
confidence values shown in Figure 11 suggests that 50%
of all referees were not very confident (i.e., confidence
values from 1 to 5) in their review. Half of all reviews
were thus written by researchers who admitted to being
marginally expert and who signaled that their review was
possibly marginally relevant. In our view, this finding
calls for a more effective assignment of papers to referees in
order to increase the number of reviews with high levels of
confidence.
Having papers reviewed by confident referees is prefer-
able for authors (who get more trustworthy remarks) and
for PC chairs (who make wiser decisions when relying on
trustworthy recommendations). The study of overall marks
with respect to referee confidence suggests that confident
referees are willing to give higher (lower) marks when
papers deserve it. Moreover, confident referees seem to use
a larger palette of marks to grade papers. These points are
illustrated in Figure 12, where bullets show the mean
overall mark (m) per confidence value and the bars extend
to the standard deviation (s) from the mean (i.e., a bar
is m + s long). In other words, it seems that confident
reviewers use the strong reject and strong accept marks
more often than less confident referees, who stick to the
less controversial weak accept, weak reject, and neutral
marks.
We extended our study by looking at the number of best
paper nominations according to referee confidence. Such
nominations appeared in 1% of all reviews only.As shown in
Figure 13, nearly half of all nominations are granted in
reviews from confident referees (with confidence values
between 8 and 10, which only accounts for 26% of all
reviews). This finding supports the idea that confident
referees are keen on voicing strong support for the papers
showing best quality.
This article questions order effects in the referee bids.We
investigate this issue in the next section.
Evidence of Order Effects in the Referee Bids
of Conferences
Let us recall the hypothesis under study: order effects
play a role in the way referees place bids on submissions.
The relationship between the submission dates of papers (as
FIG. 10. Distribution of the 19,108 reviews with respect to the overall
mark that referees gave to papers. [Color figure can be viewed in the online
issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
FIG. 11. Distribution of the 19,108 reviews with respect to referee
confidence. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is
available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
FIG. 12. Overall mark given to papers by referees according to their
confidence (N = 19,108 reviews). The mean (m) and the standard deviation
(s) of overall mark values are showed by bullets (m) and bars (m 6 s).
[Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at
wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
an independent variable) and the number of bids received
during step S2 of the peer-review process (as a dependent
variable) is studied in this section. As a reminder, note that
referees can only consult the titles and abstracts of the sub-
missions during S2, which gives no clue to them about their
quality. Consequently, paper quality plays no role in the
bidding behavior of referees.
Figure 14 shows the 42 bidding trend lines. There are
33 conferences (79%) with trend lines showing a negative
slope. For these conferences, the number of bids decreases
with higher paperIDs. In order to further the analysis, the
distribution of trend line slopes is plotted in Figure 15. The
box plot shows that the middle half of the 42 conferences
has negative slopes. Moreover, the distribution of slopes is
skewed towards negative values. This finding supports the
aforementioned hypothesis, since early submitted papers
seem to generally have received more bids than later
submissions.
What are the implications of this finding for the integrity
of peer-reviewed conferences? First, papers with positive
bids tend to get reviewed by referees with higher confidence
(Figure 9). Second, referees with higher confidence are keen
on grading good quality papers with higher marks (Fig-
ure 12). They even nominate best papers more frequently
(Figure 13). According to these two points, we may con-
clude that it is best for a paper to attract a large number of
bids.Yet, because of order effects related to their submission
date, the papers at the bottom of the submission list are
likely to attract fewer bids than the papers at the top of the
list. This difference in treatment due to a feature of papers
unrelated to quality (i.e., their submission date) is detrimen-
tal to the integrity of peer review, which is expected to be
impartial.
Limitation
There is a convenient feature in ConfMaster that
enables users to filter submission lists according to given
keywords. Consequently, some of the referees involved in
the ConfMaster2003–2011 data set may not have skimmed a
submission list for bidding; they may have filtered it thanks
to keywords representing their domain of expertise instead.
Unfortunately, there is no way to know how each referee
performed the bidding task: by skimming papers, by filter-
ing papers, or both. As a result, our findings may underes-
timate the effects of submission dates on the peer review
process.
Discussion
One may believe that order effects in referee bids do not
apply to the conferences run without any bid process (i.e., no
S2). Yet this task is devoted to PC chairs, who are in charge
of assigning papers to each referee according to their esti-
mated area of expertise. It is likely that PC chairs skimming
repeatedly through the list of submissions (sorted by
PaperID) are sensitive to the order effects that were at
stake for referees when bidding (during S2). As a result,
peer-reviewed conferences with or without a bid process
alike may need to control order effects.
Let us introduce a solution to prevent order effects
from affecting peer review through conference manage-
ment systems. The proposed solution is threefold, as we
recommend:
1. The generation of random alphanumerical paperIDs
instead of current numerical paperIDs generated sequen-
tially. The comparison of paperIDs should not inform
people about which paper was submitted before others,
hence the need for randomization. Since people may
still be tempted to (wrongly) infer precedence from the
comparison of numbers, we advise to generate random
alphanumerical strings (e.g., r3a). Such identifiers of
three characters can encode up to (26 + 10)3 = 46,656
submissions, which seems enough for any peer-reviewed
conference.
2. The promotion of bid-less papers during S2. We intend to
counterbalance order effects to improve peer review.
Since we know that positions at the top of the submission
list attract more bids (Figure 14), we should make the
most of these positions to advertise “orphan” papers (i.e.,
those attracting few or no bids). In practical terms, sub-
missions should be sorted by the number of bids they have
attracted so far (in ascending order). Tied documents (i.e.,
those with the same number of bids) should be random-
ized to avoid order effects once again. The submission list
should be re-sorted anytime it is accessed by a referee
during S2. Then, it is expected that the advertised (i.e.,
top-listed) orphan papers will attract more bids from the
referees. Eventually, the number of bids per submission
will stabilize (unlike the current negative trend slopes in
Figure 14). This will help PC chairs when assigning
papers manually or automatically (Wang et al., 2008).
This simple manipulation of the submission list will con-
tribute to counterbalancing the aforementioned undesir-
able order effects.
3. The randomization of submission lists anytime they are
displayed during S3 and S5. Order effects in choice
should be avoided by shuffling submission lists used by
both referees and PC chairs. As Bruine de Bruin (2005,
p. 245) puts it about jury evaluations, “randomization
FIG. 13. Distribution of the 243 best paper nominations (among 19,108
reviews) with respect to referee confidence. [Color figure can be viewed in
the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
cannot reduce potential order effects, but it does give
candidates an equal chance of being assigned to preferred
serial positions.”
These three recommended changes seem fairly easy to
implement in current conference management systems. We
believe that they would help improve the integrity of peer-
reviewed conferences by ensuring equal treatment of all
submitted papers.
Conclusion
The scientific community and the general public trust the
peer review process to select high-quality scientific papers.
However, it is now established that peer review suffers from
several inadequacies (Zuckerman & Merton, 1971; Benos
et al., 2007). It is of paramount importance to study and
report such issues. Scientists, aware of these pitfalls, can and
should take action to avoid them, thus contributing to the
integrity of peer review.
In this article we focused on peer-reviewed conferences
supported by paper bids. We developed the idea that order
effects play a role in the way referees place bids on submis-
sions. We failed to find any work documenting this issue in
the literature. A random sample of 42 peer-reviewed confer-
ences in Computer Science totaling 7,351 papers was
studied. We found a decreasing trend in paper bids with
respect to paper submission dates. This result has several
implications for the integrity of peer review. Indeed, papers
attracting many bids tend to be assigned to expert referees,
who are keen on voicing sharp recommendations (rejection
or acceptation). Consequently, late submissions (attracting
fewer bids than early submissions) are at a disadvantage
compared to early submissions because of order effects
related to submission dates.
We discussed a solution to prevent this issue during the
bidding phase (S2) of conference peer review: counterbal-
ance the observed order effects by manipulating the order of
papers listed in submission lists. We advised using first
positions to promote the submissions with fewer bids. The
list should be reordered according to this criterion any time
a referee skims it for bidding purposes. This intends to
globally smooth the number of bids per paper, which fosters
in turn the distribution of papers to expert referees willing to
review the papers (as they placed bids on them). As a result,
we capitalize on order effects in referee bids to secure
reviews by expert referees. In addition, we suggest assigning
randomized paperIDs to overcome order effects during S3,
as well as the randomization of evaluated papers during S5
whenever they are accessed through conference manage-
ment systems.
Following the recommendations of Hanson, Sugden, and
Alberts (2011) and Borgman (2012), the ConfMaster2003–
2011 data set used in this study is published online as an
Additional Supporting Information (Appendix A). This is
to ensure reproducibility, while fostering research on peer
FIG. 14. Trend lines for bids given to papers submitted to the 42 peer-reviewed conferences. Line width is proportional to goodness of fit (R2). Note that
the x axis is cut at position 550 for readability concerns (only one conference has 831 papers). [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is
available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
FIG. 15. Box plot of the trend line slopes for paper bids shown in
Figure 14. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is
available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
review as implemented by current scientific conferences.
Further research should address a larger body of conferences
from Computer Science, as well as from all other domains
of science.
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Appendix A. The ConfMaster2003–2011 Data set of 42 Peer–Reviewed Conferences
The data set is supplied as an XML file, and released as an online Additional Supporting Information to this article
(Appendix S1). An excerpt of the data set is shown in Listing 1, where the document type definition (DTD) precedes the
records of the 42 peer-reviewed conferences.
Listing 1
<!--
ConfMaster2003-2011: 42 peer-reviewed conferences held between 2003 and 2011
License: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.
(see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)
@version 08-MAR-2012
@author Guillaume Cabanac (guillaume.cabanac@univ-tlse3.fr)













<!ATTLIST conference id CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!ATTLIST submission id CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!ATTLIST review idReferee CDATA #REQUIRED>



















<bid idReferee=”6399” interest=”2” />
<bid idReferee=”6400” interest=”1” />
<!-- . . . -->
<bid idReferee=”8809” interest=”-1” />
</submission>
<!-- . . . -->
<submission id=”869”>
<!-- . . . -->
</submission>
</conference>
<!-- . . . -->
</confmaster>
